The federal government, state agencies and individual natural gas pipelines need to work cooperatively to develop emergency-response plans that clear the path for the rapid reconstruction of facilities damaged in either terrorist attacks, natural disasters or by ruptures to pipeline systems, federal and state officials agreed last week, as they met to carve out their roles during emergency situations.

“If a pipeline or critical energy source were to be affected by a terrorist attack, one person or an agency must be in control and invested with the authority to waive any regulation” that would block or slow down restoration of service, said John Gawronski, chief of gas safety with the New York State Public Service Commission (NYSPSC).

“We’d like to suggest a federal agency has that authority first to declare the emergency and to make sure that it is in fact an emergency that requires extraordinary efforts, such as the waiving of regulations” to expedite the rebuilding of facilities, he said during a conference last Monday sponsored by FERC and the Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) exploring the emergency re-construction of interstate gas pipelines.

Once a pipeline emergency is declared, however, Gawronski believes states are best equipped to get damaged facilities promptly re-built. “For a pipeline, we [NSPSC] can be one of those agencies at the state level that can take the ball and run with it” to ensure a line is re-built safely, he said. When it comes to pipelines, the New York commission is the agency that other emergency agencies would have to deal with, he noted.

In the wake of Sept 11, many states have updated or created terrorist response plans that require cooperation with the federal and local governments, said Kevin Bliss of the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC), which represents the governors of oil- and gas-producing states. “Thus, we believe that the states are the most effective…to bring all branches of government together in an emergency situation.”

During emergency situations, he noted that state governors have “useful” powers to assist the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, such as bypassing some regulatory steps. “Even in the absence of [an] extraordinary emergency, the governors have great powers to get state agencies to focus on issues of immediate importance.”

For example, during the California electricity crisis, FERC sought and received the support of the governors of Wyoming, Utah, Nevada and California for an expansion project of Kern River Transmission that “greatly” increased capacity on its system, Bliss said. In addition, the states have developed a proposal to streamline the siting of gas pipelines to respond to the increased capacity needs of the power generation market.

In an effort to expedite emergency re-construction of pipelines, Robert Rosenthal of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PaPUC) recommended that FERC require pipelines to have emergency-response plans (including restoration of service) in place as part of the certificate process on the facilities.

FERC currently has a number authorities under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) and Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) to speed the reconstruction of damaged pipe facilities, but there are restrictions with respect to the dollar amount of the project to be rebuilt, the timing that construction can be initiated, and the time period within which temporary pipe facilities can be in use.

Section 2.55 of the NGA would allow pipes to immediately rebuild only their damaged facilities. Blanket certificate authority would permit immediate re-building of facilities under $7.5 million without having to give FERC prior notice, while it would require a 45-day prior notice to replace facilities that cost more than $7.5 million and less than $21 million; a temporary certificate would enable “minor” facilities to be re-built quickly; under Part 284 of the NGPA, pipes could receive the immediate go-ahead to build temporary facilities (limited to 60 days of use) around a damaged area; and the traditional Section 7(c) authority would allow reconstruction within a period of six to 18 months.

Dinah Bear of the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) said the council has worked closely with federal agencies to work out “alternative arrangements” in the face of emergency situations, without triggering National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements. The CEQ is charged with overseeing the NEPA law, which requires federal agencies to assess the environmental impact of proposed actions before making decisions.

While most agencies consult with the CEQ before taking action to deal with emergency situations, she noted that the regulations do not explicitly require the agencies to confer with the council. The CEQ has had “very good success with these arrangements” in response to emergencies, said Bear, but she noted “we have also been careful not to abuse the situation.”

The council’s track record in working with other federal agencies is a good one, Bear told the joint FERC-OPS conference. “We’ve never had a complaint from a federal agency [that] felt we were somehow difficult to work with” in emergency circumstances. Given that the CEQ’s staff has only 26 members, she said other federal agencies will not face a lot of red tape when they seek help. She further advised agencies to not “stand on formality” when they need CEQ action.

With respect to threats to pipeline systems, the New York commission’s Gawronski said he doubted that interstate natural gas pipelines would be chosen as primary targets by terrorists. “It’s hard to imagine that pipeline systems themselves are going to be the immediate targets” of terrorists.

Rather, it’s more likely to expect that pipe facilities and other energy infrastructure would sustain “collateral damage” stemming from attacks on other targets. Gas distribution lines and other energy facilities were secondary targets in New York City on Sept. 11, Gawronski pointed out. The city and state took extraordinary steps — bypassing normal construction procedures and environmental requirements, in some cases — to quickly restore service to affected areas, he said, “and it worked.”

When it comes to dealing with the public, Jim O’Steen, deputy associate administrator at the OPS, said routine pipeline failures and shutdowns pose a much “greater challenge” for pipelines than terrorist attacks. While “the public is much more likely to support the restoration of the service” in the wake of a terrorist attack, it’s likely to oppose it “if it’s an accident from erosion or outside force damage…partly because of the fear that other parts of the system may not be safe,” he noted.

Moreover, O’Steen believes that natural disasters, as well as defects in pipeline system, “can do much broader and probably greater damage” to gas pipelines than any terrorist attack. While “terrorism caused us to start looking at the need for rapid restoration of service” on gas pipelines, “it is not probably the most likely cause of an emergency,” he said.

O’Steen identified a number of critical factors that could affect how quickly service is restored:

As a result of a recent “terrorist scenario” drill conducted at Colonial Pipeline, a liquid line, O’Steen said the OPS learned that planning was critical to an effective response to disasters. The planning process, he noted, included identifying critical pipeline assets, preparing a communication plan to assure the public that the re-construction efforts were safe, and establishing key relationships with the appropriate federal and state agencies, local authorities and the individual pipeline companies.

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