Canada’s move into Asian energy markets has been described by PetroChina International (America) Inc. (PCIA), a Houston-based trading arm of China National Petroleum Corp. as only just beginning. The move will be gradual, one step at a time, it said.

The United States is not about to lose its largest supplies of imported oil and natural gas overnight, if in fact, current southbound pipeline deliveries from Canada eventually drop at all.

PCIA put the strategy into perspective in a letter of support for a successful application by Kinder Morgan Canada to the National Energy Board (NEB) to make a modest, quiet start on creating a new overseas trading pattern.

The NEB recently authorized Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain Pipeline across Alberta and British Columbia (BC) to dedicate 54,000 b/d, or 18% of its 300,000 b/d capacity, to loading oil tankers for five shippers including PCIA at its Westridge Marine Terminal in Vancouver Harbor. Previously, overseas shipments were highly variable spot cargoes ranging from monthly averages near zero to a high of 143,000 b/d, depending on market conditions.

The NEB was told, “PCIA is interested in establishing business arrangements in Canada. Securing firm service to the Westridge Marine Terminal is a first step for PCIA in developing long-term relationships with Canadian oil suppliers. It is also of great interest to PCIA to gain firm access to transportation systems that can be used to increase crude oil supply to the Pacific Basin.”

Similar approaches were outlined by the other four shippers involved in the Trans Mountain commitment, which include Alberta oilsands developers Cenovus Energy Inc. and Nexen Inc. Both called the Asian marketing initiative a case of looking for markets for new production, rather than alternative outlets for current output.

The same pattern shows in two liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminal projects currently advancing through regulatory, marketing and construction stages on BC’s northern Pacific coast at Kitimat: KM LNG and BC LNG. Supporters have made it plain that the schemes are intended as outlets for half or more of new gas production under development in the Horn River Shale gas deposit near BC’s boundary with the Yukon and Northwest Territories.

For political purposes, arising from a U.S. administration delay in approving the hotly contested Keystone XL oilsands export pipeline project sponsored by TransCanada Corp., Canadian leaders up to and including Prime Minister Stephen Harper say the country is charting a new energy course to Asia.

For practical purposes, the politicians have yet to make any move to make changes that might speed up aspects of the energy transportation and marketing process that they control or influence. No steps have been attempted, for instance, to shorten an imminent regulatory torture test for Enbridge Inc.’s Northern Gateway project, a C$5.5 billion (U.S. dollar at par) proposal for a new oil pipeline from Edmonton to Kitimat.

The hearings schedule on the scheme by a joint review panel of the NEB and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency has stretched into a two-year marathon, running through 2012-2013. Green and aboriginal protesters used a procedural wrinkle to book time for a filibuster. An estimated 4,000 opponents have registered to make oral statements at community hearings along the project route.

Kinder Morgan’s growth strategy — the TMX Project, short for Trans Mountain expansion — has the advantage of using an established pipeline right-of-way. An open season for up to 300,000 b/d in potential new capacity to load up tankers with oilsands production is under way. But the schedule indicates that obtaining approval and building the additions will take about five years.

The recent Chinese interest follows on forays by Japanese and Korean companies, tapping into Canadian resources.

Since 1978, Japan Canada Oil Sands Ltd. (JCOS) — 86% owned by Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. — has been working on a 460-square-kilometer (184-square-mile) bitumen lease 50 kilometers (30 miles) south of Fort McMurray.

Unlike the internationally famous 20% of the oilsands that are shallow enough for open pit mining, the JCOS deposit requires underground thermal extraction. To date, the operation remains in an oilsands beginner stage known in the industry as the “demonstration project,” with technology trials pumping out 10,000 b/d. Regulatory applications are pending for a potential expansion.

Despite numerous high-profile corporate deals on financing for projects that remain well down the planning, regulatory and construction road into the oilsands future, only one Chinese investment to date includes significant bitumen production. Sinopec Canada, an arm of China’s refining empire, owns 9% of the 300,000 b/d syncrude mine and synthetic crude upgrading complex north of Fort McMurray as a result of a $4.6 billion purchase of the minority share in the plant from ConocoPhillips in 2010.

Only the two biggest and strongest Asian connections of Canadian oil and gas corporations to date break the pattern of the buyers settling for minority investment interests rather than control and operational leadership.

Chinese involvement dates back to 1987, when Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. — the international trading firm of Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-shing — bought majority control of Husky Energy for C$855 million. In 2009 South Korea’s state-owned Korea National Oil Co. paid C$4.1 billion for outright ownership of Harvest Energy, which owns a Newfoundland oil export refinery at Come By Chance and an array of conventional oil and gas properties in the western provinces.

The Asian backing has yet to escalate into an Asian invasion by fueling rapid acceleration of oilsands development. Husky is moving ahead, in a partnership arrangement with BP, on a staged growth strategy of advancing projects in years-long phases. Harvest has yet to make a start on tapping its bitumen belt properties.

And the strictly business pattern of wary, gradual development followed by Canada’s Asian energy arrangements to date includes a reminder that success is not guaranteed by catching the eye of a potential partner with deep pockets. Encana Corp. is still smarting from an embarrassment suffered during the summer, when a year of negotiations ended in the collapse of a C$5.4 billion tentative joint venture deal with PetroChina, an arm of China National Petroleum, for developing BC shale gas.

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